












Lally School of Management and Technology 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
 
Hila Etzion 
Assistant Professor of Technology and Operations 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  






Ross School of Business Working Paper 





This work cannot be used without the author's permission.  
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the  




Online Auctions and Multichannel Retailing 
Jason Kuruzovich 
Lally School of Management and Technology 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 




Stephen M. Ross School of Business  
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234  
Email: etzionh@umich.edu  
 
The Internet enables sellers to offer products through multiple channels simultaneously. In 
particular, many sellers utilize online auctions in parallel to other online and offline 
channels. Using an analytical model and data from eBay Motors, we study seller behavior and 
auction outcomes in the context of multichannel retailing. Our model shows that seller 
characteristics which affect the distribution and volume of offers in the non-auction channels 
impact the probability an auction ends in a sale, the probability an item is sold through the auction 
channel, and the sale price in case of a sale. The impact on the two probabilities can be negative or 
positive and depends on whether the seller manages the channels jointly or separately. Our 
empirical analysis examines how the quality of the seller’s retail location and her electronic 
commerce capabilities (i.e., two seller characteristics influencing demand in non-auction channels) 
impact the auction channel outcomes. The results confirm the joint channel management strategy 
considered in the analytical model.   









1.  Introduction 
In many markets that involve unique items—i.e., used cars, used books, real estate, and antiques—sellers 
often use several selling channels in parallel. For example, a seller may try to sell an item through her 
brick and mortar retail location while simultaneously listing it in an online auction site such as eBay, her 
own website, and other popular third-party websites which facilitate interactions between buyers and 
sellers (i.e., Cars.com or the Amazon Marketplace). This multichannel strategy is facilitated by the 
Internet, which decouples the information component of transactions from the logistics component (Van 
Heck and Ribbers 1997). The Internet enables retailers to reach out to a broader group of customers 
through a variety of online channels, while offering the product to local customers through a traditional 
offline location. Given the ease by which even very small retailers can establish online presences utilizing 
online marketplaces such as Amazon or eBay, it is increasingly important to develop an understanding of 
sellers’ practices in multichannel contexts.  
Online auctions have gained enormous popularity. The eBay marketplace alone facilitates over 64 
billion dollars in merchandise per year and involves over 95 million active users (eBay 2011). Online 
auctions like those conducted on eBay attract heterogeneous sellers, and important auction outcomes, 
such as when sales occur and the sale prices, can be easily observed. Past research has found that seller’s 
rating, the existence of a buy-now price, and the starting bid—i.e., seller and auction characteristics 
observable by bidders—are associated with both the auction sale price and the likelihood of sale (Ba and 
Pavlou 2002; Livingston 2005; Ottaway et al. 2003). Recent research has begun to identify ways in which 
contextual characteristics of the auction channel not directly observed by bidders, such as the existence of 
concurrent or prior auctions for the same or similar item(s), can influence auction outcomes (Arora et al. 
2002; Bapna et al. 2003; Kuruzovich et al. 2010). However, it is yet unknown how auction outcomes 
might be influenced by the seller’s simultaneous use of non-auction selling channels. 
To address this gap in the literature, this paper utilizes both analytical and empirical approaches to 
show that seller characteristics related to the demand in non-auction channels influence the auction 
channel outcomes. Specifically, we use the theoretical foundation of search theory (Diamond 1985) to 
analytically model how seller characteristics that affect the volume or the distribution of offers received 
(i.e., the demand) in non-auction channels influence the probability a given auction ends in a sale (the 
auction-sale probability), the probability a given item the seller lists in the auction channel is sold through 
the auction channel (the item-sale probability), and the expected sale price (sale price) when an auction 
ends in a sale. 
 Search theory (Ashenfelter et al. 2003; Genesove 1995; Genesove and Mayer 2001) predicts that 
sellers with better ability to make a sale in the non-auction channels would set higher reserve prices in 
both the auction channel and the non-auction channels, resulting in two opposing effects on the 
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probability an auction ends in a sale and the probability a given item sells via the auction channel. 
Specifically, an increase in the non-auction reserve price would increase both probabilities, while an 
increase in the auction reserve price would decrease them. Thus, the combined effect on the auction 
channel outcomes is not clear in advance. Our analytical model allows us to derive predictions regarding 
the nature of the combined effect.   We show that the relationship between such seller characteristics and 
the auction outcomes depends upon whether the seller manages the auction and non-auction channels 
jointly (i.e., setting reserve prices in the different channels to maximize combined profit) or separately. 
We then empirically test our analytical model’s predictions with specific seller characteristics related 
to the quality of the seller’s retail location and her electronic commerce capabilities in non-auction online 
channels. The empirical analyses use outcomes from 43,461 online auctions conducted on eBay Motors 
by 296 multichannel retailers for 21,630 unique vehicles. The analysis confirms that a seller’s retail 
location and her electronic commerce capabilities significantly impact the above three auction channel 
outcomes. Specifically, a better retail location or improved electronic capabilities in non-auction channels 
lead to a lower likelihood of the reserve price being met and a sale occurring in an individual auction 
(auction-sale), a lower likelihood of a vehicle being sold through the online auction channel (item-sale), 
but a higher price in the auction channel when a sale occurs (sale price).  Overall, our results suggest that 
sellers engage in the joint channel management strategy examined in the analytical model and may raise 
their online auction reserve price in response to better sales opportunities in other channels. 
This research contributes to the understanding of how sellers use online auctions alongside other 
channels, an area in which there has been little past research. Consideration of all three channel outcomes 
(auction-sale, item-sale, and sale price) in the analytical and empirical treatments enables a more 
complete understanding of sellers’ strategies and the cross-channel effects in a multichannel context. 
While prior work examines consumer behaviors in multichannel contexts (Ariely and Simonson 2003; 
Etzion et al. 2006; Kumar and Venkatesan 2005; Venkatesan et al. 2007) and seller behaviors in online 
and offline channels (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Forman et al. 2009; Overby and Jap 2009), this is the 
first paper to present a theoretically-grounded treatment of how sellers’ characteristics related to demand 
in the non-auction channels affect their online auctions’ outcomes. Thus, this research provides insights 
into how retailers use auctions as part of a multichannel strategy, answering calls for more research on 
online auctions (Pinker et al. 2003) and multichannel seller strategies (Neslin and Shankar 2009). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first review how search theory has been used to study 
outcomes of the auction channel and present the theoretical framework used in the paper. Next, we 
present the analytical model that explores the relationship between characteristics of the demand in non-
auction channels and auction channel outcomes. The predictions from the analytical model are then tested 
using data from eBay Motors. Finally, implications for theory and practice are discussed. 
4 
 
2. Theory  
This section first reviews how search theory has been used to study auction channel outcomes. It then 
further discusses how seller characteristics related to the demand in non-auction channels are expected to 
influence the auction channel outcomes of interest. 
2.1. Search Theory and Online Auctions 
This research utilizes search theory to understand seller behavior in online auctions as part of a 
multichannel strategy. Search theory specifies that the process of search is influenced by both the 
potential benefits and the costs of continuing the search (Diamond 1985). When applied to the study of 
online auctions, search theory can explain a seller’s rationale in setting her reserve price (Ashenfelter 
1989; Genesove 1995). Setting a high reserve price decreases the chance that the reserve price will be met 
and the auction will end in a sale, but increases the minimum sale price when a sale occurs. Conversely, 
lowering the reserve price increases the likelihood of sale, but decreases the minimum sale price. In other 
words, the seller faces a tradeoff between the sale price and the time required to find a buyer, making 
search a relevant foundation for understanding the process through which sellers set their reserve price.  
Ashenfelter (1989) first suggested that search theory may explain how sellers set and then adjust their 
reserve price over time. Genesove (1995) empirically tested a model of search in the context of wholesale 
auto auctions, examining how the mean and variance of market prices for a vehicle influence the search 
process of sellers in the auctions. Building on this work, Ashenfelter et al. (2003) modeled the sale rate of 
art as a search process, examining how sellers’ reserve prices depend upon market characteristics (i.e., the 
variance in prices). Genesove and Mayer (2001) found that sellers who originally paid higher prices for 
condominiums also set higher asking prices when subsequently selling, showing that the reserve price and 
the time on market are influenced by seller-specific characteristics. Kuruzovich et al. (2010) examined 
how seller search across sequential online auctions influences the price the seller obtains for an item. 
Overall, this prior research suggests that search theory can be useful to understanding how sellers set 
reserve prices when using online auctions alongside other channels. Just as consumers may search for the 
right product and price across the variety of channels available to them (Ratchford et al. 2003; Ratchford 
and Srinivasan 1993), sellers of unique items can be conceptualized as searching for a high-valuation 
buyer across multiple channels, trying to maximize the difference between the price they would obtain 
and the cost of search (Genesove 1995; Kuruzovich et al. 2010).  
On most auctions websites it is not possible to observe sellers’ reserve prices, as these prices are 
private and hidden from bidders. However, by examining the relationship between seller characteristics 
related to demand in non-auction channels and relevant auction outcomes, we can infer the unobserved 
relationship between such characteristics and the hidden auction reserve price. For example, Genesove 
(1995) examined multichannel sales processes in the auto industry prior to the emergence of the Internet 
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(the auction data was from 1951), when dealers alternated between wholesale auctions and their retail 
location. A wholesale auction would end in a sale if the reserve price was met
1
, and when the reserve 
price was not met the seller had to transport the vehicle back to the retail site. Genesove (1995) found that 
the expected sale price in the retail channel was negatively related to the likelihood of sale in the 
wholesale auction channel, indicating that the reserve price in the online auction is influenced by factors 
driving the price the seller expects to obtain in the other channel (i.e., the retail location). We incorporate 
this result in our theoretical framework. 
2.2. Theoretical Framework  
In this paper we consider sellers of unique items who use the online auction channel in parallel to other 
non-auction channels. In the auction channel, the seller sets a hidden reserve price, which serves as a 
lower bound on the sale price, and consumers compete for the item by submitting bids. In the non-auction 
channels, consumers interact directly with the seller by submitting offers (Pennington 1968). Thus, the 
seller’s strategy in the non-auction channels also consists of a secret reserve price, and she accepts the 
first offer that exceeds the reserve price. Our theoretical framework, presented in Figure 1, demonstrates 
how seller characteristics that impact the demand in the non-auction channels, and are not apparent to 
bidders, are expected to affect important auction channel outcomes. As is described next, such effects can 
be either direct or indirect via strategic changes in the seller’s reserve prices.  
 2.2.1. Auction-Sale Probability. The auction-sale probability is the probability the auction ends in a 
sale. When considering auctions in isolation, the auction-sale probability is simply the probability that the 
seller’s reserve price is met. In contrast, when sellers use auctions in parallel to other channels, the 
auction-sale probability is more complex because the seller may terminate the auction early if she 
receives an attractive offer via another channel, and she may do so whether or not the highest bid received 
by that time exceeds the reserve price. Thus, the auction-sale probability is affected directly by the 
characteristics of the demand in the non-auction channels. Specifically, better opportunities in non-
auction channels increase the probability that an auction would be terminated early, and thus decrease the 
probability that the auction would end in a sale. However, according to search theory, better sale 
opportunities in the non-auction channels would lead the seller to use a higher reserve price in these 
channels. An increase in the non-auction reserve price decreases the probability that the auction would be 
terminated early. These two opposing effects (the direct effect and the indirect effect via the non-auction 
reserve price) do not arise when the seller alternates between the channels as in Genesove (1995), but do 
take place when the seller uses the two channels simultaneously. Finally, previous research utilizing 
                                                          
1
 This is not true when considering the simultaneous use of online auctions and other channels. In this case, even if 
the reserve is met the seller can terminate the auction early due to an acceptable offer in another channel.  
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search theory predicts that the auction’s reserve price would also increase with seller characteristics that 
represent better opportunities in non-auction channels (Genesove 1995). An increase in the auction 
reserve price should have a negative impact on the auction-sale probability. 
Figure 1   Conceptual Framework  
 
Note. A plus (minus) sign next to an arrow represents positive (negative) impact—for example, a better 
retail location is expected to have a negative impact on auction-sale probability, and a positive impact on 
the non-auction reserve price. 
 2.2.2 Item-Sale Probability. The seller offers the item in successive auctions until it is sold either in 
an auction or in a non-auction channel. The item-sale probability is the probability that the item sells via 
the auction channel, and is a relevant measure of the auction channel performance only in a multi-channel 
context. Seller characteristics related to demand in non-auction channels can affect the item-sale 
probability in three ways. First, improved opportunities in non-auction channels have a direct negative 
effect on the item-sale probability due to the higher likelihood that each auction in which the item is 
offered would be terminated early. Second, as with the auction-sale probability, this direct affect is 
mitigated by the strategic increase in the seller’s reserve price in the non-auction channels. Third, search 
theory predicts that better opportunities in non-auction channels would lead to a higher a reserve price in 
the auction channel (Genesove 1995), which would have a negative effect on the item-sale probability 
 2.2.3. Sale Price. The auction sale price captures the value obtained by the seller, and it is relevant 
only for auctions that end in a sale. The sale price in a given auction is not affected directly by seller 
characteristics related to demand in other channels or by the seller’s reserve price in those channels. Such 
seller characteristics are expected to affect auction sale prices only through their influence on the seller’s 
reserve price in the auction channel. When a seller has better opportunities in other channels, her 
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opportunity cost for accepting a low price in the auction is higher. Thus, better opportunities outside of 
the auction channel are expected to lead to higher auction reserve prices. While the auction reserve price 
typically cannot be observed, past findings indicate that the presence of a reserve price is associated with 
a higher sale price (Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007), and sellers with systematically higher reserve prices are 
likely to experience higher auction sale prices relative to other sellers in the market.  
3. The Model 
We model a seller with an item for sale who simultaneously uses several selling channels, one of which is 
an online auction channel (e.g., eBay marketplace). The non-auction channel(s) may include the seller’s 
local store, her website, and third party websites. We refer to these non-auction channels collectively as 
“the direct channel”, because consumers utilizing these channels interact directly with the seller rather 
than bid against each other. We consider the simultaneous use of the direct channel and the online auction 
channel and examine how the characteristics of the demand in the direct channel affect the auction 
channel outcomes.  
The seller lists the item in successive auctions of similar length, while simultaneously offering the 
item in the direct channel, until the item is sold in one channel or the other. We define the time period in 
the model as the length of one auction, discount future gains and costs at a rate of   per period, and 
assume a periodic holding cost of c. For simplification, if the seller sells the item in the direct channel 
during the y
th
 period (i.e., during the y
th
 auction), we assume he still incurs the holding cost for the entire 
y
th
 period. This assumption should not have a significant effect on the results. In addition, to simplify the 
treatment of multiple channels, we assume that demands on the two channels originate from two separate 
groups of consumers. This assumption has been often used in past research on multichannel marketing. 
For example, Van Ryzin and Vulcano (2004) examine the optimal pricing-replenishment policy when the 
firm sells in two markets—one fixed-price market and one auction market—and assume demand comes 
from two different and independent streams of customers. In addition, past research suggests that online 
auctions are “sticky” channels; buyers engaged in competitive bidding with others frequently ignore 
comparable offerings in the readily available fixed-price channel, even when such offerings are less 
expensive than the winning bid of the auction (Ariely and Simonson 2003). It is reasonable, therefore, to 
assume that the majority of consumers using the online auction channel engage with the seller only 
through the online auction channel and not across multiple channels. Next we characterize the demand in 
each of the channels. 
The demand in the direct channel consists of  offers per period. Offers arrive sequentially at random 
times during the period, and each offer is drawn independently from the common distribution F with 
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support set [βL, βH].
2
 The two parameters, β and , are seller-specific and represent the ability of the 
seller to attract offers in this channel. Specifically, β determines the quality of the average offer (in terms 
of price) as well as the lowest and highest possible offers, and  determines the volume of offers per 
period. Both a better support set (higher β) and higher volume (higher ) can reduce the duration of time 
it takes the seller to reach a desired reserve price in the direct channel. The seller’s strategy in the direct 
channel is defined by a hidden reserve price, RD, and she accepts the first offer that exceeds the reserve 
price. When such an offer arrives, the seller sells the item and terminates the currently going auction.  
In the auction channel, the seller expects N bidders to participate in each auction, and each bidder’s 
willingness to pay is drawn independently from the distribution F with support set [L, H]. The seller’s 
strategy is defined by a hidden reserve price, RA, such that he would sell the item in the auction if the 
highest bid received in the auction exceeds RA, and the item was not sold in the direct channel prior to the 
auction’s stated end time. We assume all bidders use proxy bidding (the default bidding strategy in eBay 
and eBay Motors) and that there is a negligible bid increment. Thus, it is optimal for bidders to submit 
their true willingness to pay as their proxy bid and let the auction mechanism bid on their behalf the 
minimum amount needed to win, but only up to their proxy bid (Lucking-Reiley 2000). If only one bidder 
submits a proxy bid that is higher than RA then the winning-bid would simply be RA. If at least two 
bidders submit proxy bids higher than RA, then the winning-bid is determined by the expected value of the 
(N-1) order statistic of N random draws from the distribution F (i.e., the value of the second highest proxy 
bid). We denote the CDF of the second highest draw out of the N draws by GN ( ). Table 1 summarizes the 
notation used in the model. 
In our suggested model, the parameters L and H, as well as the distribution F, are item-specific 
and are assumed to be the same across channels. In contrast, the parameters β and  indicate seller 
characteristics and capabilities that can affect demand in the direct channel but not in the auction channel.  
In addition, the two channels differ in the mechanism of interaction between seller and consumers.  
Specifically, in the direct channel the seller will accept the first offer that arrives which exceeds RD, while 
in the auction channel the price would be determined by the second highest proxy bid that exceeds RA. 
Finally, in this paper we analyze a deterministic model in regards to the number of bidders per auction 
and the number of offers that the seller may receive in the direct channel during an auction. Assuming the 
number of bidders per auction and the number of offers in the direct channel during an auction are drawn 
                                                          
2
  We do not argue that F is the distribution of valuations, nor do we try to model the relationship between valuations 
and offers. For the purpose of our model all that matters is that the quality of the offers in the direct channel depends 
on the parameter β while the quality of bids in the auction channel does not.  
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from Poisson distributions with the parameters N and  respectively would not have significant impact on 
our results, but would significantly complicate the numerical treatments. 
Table 1.   Notation for Analytical Model 
Variable Description 
β Measure of the quality of the offers in the direct channel  
 Number of offers in the direct channel per period  
N Number of bidders in each auction 
c Periodic holding cost  
ρ Periodic discounting rate 
F(β) CDF of offers in the direct channel; support set [βL, βH]  
F CDF of proxy bids in the auction channel; support set  [L, H] 
GN CDF of the price in an ascending open-bid auction with N bidders (i.e., CDF of the 
second highest bid)  
RD Reserve price in the direct channel 
RA Reserve price in the auction 
3.1. The Expected Profit 
The general setup of the model is consistent with a seller search model (Ashenfelter 1989; Genesove 
1995; Genesove and Mayer 2001), in which the seller optimizes profit considering the tradeoffs between 
the time and cost required for finding a buyer, and the resulting price obtained. The expected profit at the 
beginning of period (auction) t is given by: 
           
      
          
                   (1) 
(    
     ) [     |        ]    
       
       (       )   
    
     (        ) [           |              ]    , 
where the expected value of an offer in the direct channel conditional on it being larger than the reserve 
price is given by: 
 [     |        ]  
∫         
  
  
∫        
  
  
,      (2) 
and the expected value of the winning bid conditional on it being larger than the auction’s reserve price is 
given by: 
 [           |              ]  
∫          
 
  
∫         
 
  
.    (3) 
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The first term in Equation 1 is the profit in case there is no sale in period t, which equals the 
discounted profit from period t+1. This case happens with probability   
      
     . The second term 
in Equation 1 is the expected profit when the seller receives an acceptable offer in the direct channel 
during the t auction, and terminates the t auction. The third term gives the expected profit in case the 
seller does not make a sale in the direct channel during the auction and exactly one bidder has a valuation 
higher than the auction reserve price, RA. Finally, the last term is the expected profit when the seller does 
not make a sale in the direct channel during the auction, and at least two bidders have valuation higher 
than RA. This last case happens with probability   
     (        ). Note that if N=1 (there is only one 
bidder), then          and the last term becomes zero. 
Finally, we can substitute                  and                 in Equation 1, and solve 
for       to get: 
       
     
(      
      
     )
*        (4) 
( (    
     )
∫        
  
  
∫       
  
  
   
     (  
                   ∫          
 
  
)   )  
The above equation can be used to derive the profit from utilizing only the direct channel or only the 
online auction channel. When the seller uses only the direct channel, we simply need to substitute 
        in Equation 4, which gives: 
     ( 
   
      
     
)((    
     )
∫         
  
  
∫        
  
  
  ).   (5) 
When the seller uses only the online auctions we substitute          in Equation 4, which gives: 
    ( 
   
         
 ) (  
       (       )   ∫          
 
  
  )    (6)    
Holding everything else equal, as RD increases the expected price in the direct channel increases while 
the probability of sale via the direct channel at any given period decreases. Similarly, holding everything 
else equal, as RA increases the expected auction price increases, while the probability of sale via the 
auction channel at any given auction decreases. The expected number of periods until a sale takes place 
and the related search costs when considering the simultaneous use of both channels also increase with 
increases in RD or RA. Figure 2 illustrates the seller’s expected profit,      , in the RA-RD space when F 
is the uniform distribution. Increasing a reserve price past the optimal value results in a decrease in 
overall profit because the costs induced from longer search do not adequately make up for the higher 
resulting sale price. As can be seen from Figure 2, however, the profit is not always a concave function of 
the auction reserve price. Next, we derive the expressions for the auction-channel outcomes of interest.  
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 Figure 2.  The Expected Multichannel Profit in the RD-RA Space 
 
 Note. L=0, H=100, β=1.2, c=1, ρ=1, N=2, =1 and F is the uniform distribution. 
3.2. Auction Channel Outcomes 
The expected auction price in case of a sale (EP) is given in Equation 7. The price equals the second 
highest proxy bid in case there are at least two proxy bids that exceed the seller’s reserve price, and equals 
the reserve price in case there is one proxy bid that exceeds the reserve. The auction-sale probability (AS) 
is given in Equation 8. Unlike when considering an auction in isolation, here the auction-sale probability 
is a decreasing function of the likelihood of a sale in the direct channel. Finally, the item-sale probability 
(IS), as given in Equation 9, is the sum over all periods, t=1 to , of the probability that the item is sold in 
the t online auction. The probability that the item is sold in the t online auction is the product of the 
probability there is no acceptable offer in the direct channel during the first t auctions, the probability that 
there is no acceptable bid in the first t-1 auctions, and the probability that at least one bid in the t auction 
exceeds RA. 
   
∫        
 
  
          (       )  
        
       (7) 
     
         
                 (8) 
   ∑ (  
     )
 
        
             
 
   .      (9) 
 As can be seen from the above expressions, while the expected auction price does not depend directly 
on RD, β, or , it is an increasing function of RA, and under a joint management strategy the optimal value 
of RA may depend on β and . In contrast, the auction-sale probability and the item-sale probability are 
functions of RD and are also direct functions of β and  (this is consistent with our theoretical framework 
presented in Section 2). Specifically, an increase in β or  has a direct negative effect on the AS and IS 
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probabilities, but is expected to also affect these two outcomes indirectly via the changes it may cause in 
the values of the optimal reserve prices.  
4. Model Analysis 
In what follows, we examine how characteristics of the demand in the direct channel (i.e., β and ) affect 
the three auction channel outcomes of interest under two management strategies: (1) the independent 
management strategy, in which reserve price is set for each channel to maximize that channel’s profit, and 
(2) the joint management strategy, in which reserve prices for the two channels are set to maximize the 
overall multichannel profit. To do so, we assume a specific distribution for F, the uniform distribution. 
When F is the uniform distribution, GN is given by: 
      (
   
   
)
              
     
,             (10) 
and the total multichannel profit is given by: 
                 (11) 
  (           (
     
   
)
 
(               ))(
     
     
)
 
       
 
 
       (   (
     




   
                





   
 . 
4.1. Channels Managed Separately 
In some cases different departments/individuals manage the different selling channels. This management 
strategy might simplify operation, but often leads to sub-optimal profit. When the seller manages the 
channels separately, RD is set to maximize the profit as given in Equation 5, and RA is set to maximize the 
profit from Equation 6. Thus, RD will be a function of β and , but RA would not. As a result, the expected 
auction sale price, EP, does not depend on seller’s characteristics related to demand in the direct channel, 
while the auction-sale and item-sale probabilities do. An increase in β or  has a direct negative effect on 
the auction-sale and the item-sale probabilities. However, as explained in Section 2, an increase in β or  
is also expected to lead to a higher RD, which in turn has a positive effect on both probabilities. Thus, by 
how much the optimal RD changes in reaction to changes in β or  will determine the combined effect on 
the two probabilities. Finally, it is easy to show that under this management strategy the sign of the 
derivative of AS with respect to β is the same as the sign of the derivative of IS with respect to  , and thus 
it is sufficient for us to examine how one of the two probabilities (IS or AS) changes with β
3
. Similarly, it 
can be shown that either both probabilities increase or both decrease in .  
                                                          
3
 This is no longer true when the optimal RA is a function of β . 
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Ideally, we would like to obtain closed-form expressions for the optimal values of RD and RA as a 
function of the model parameters (using first order conditions and assuming the profit is concave), then 
substitute these two expressions in the equation for AS, and finally examine derivatives of AS with respect 
to β and . However, since it is not feasible to derive closed-form expressions for the optimal reserve 
prices, (i.e., for the values of RD and RA that maximize the expressions from Equation 5 and Equation 6 
respectively), we examined numerically a large set of parameter values to determine whether the AS 
probability and the IS probability increase or decrease due to an increase in β or . We normalized H to 
100 and considered L values between 0 and H in increments of 20, c values between 0.5% of H and 4% of 
H in increments of 0.5, ρ values between 0% and 4% of H in increments of 0.5, N values between 1 and 
10 in increments of 1, and  values between 1 and 104. Finally, we consider β values between 0.8 and 1.2 
in increments of 0.1, so that the expected offer in the direct channel does not vary by more than 20% from 
the expected willingness to bid in the auction channel. Above values gave us 180,000 possible 
combinations of parameter values. Experimenting with different H values would only re-scale the 
problem.  
We determined numerically the optimal reserve price in the direct channel,   
 , from Equation 5, and 
the optimal auction reserve price,   
 , from Equation 6 for any given combination of parameter values (H, 
L, β, N, , c, and  ). Then, for every possible combination of parameter values we evaluated the change in 
the AS probability, and the change in the optimal reserve price   
 , when β increases by 0.1, and when –
the number of offers–increases by 1 (the optimal auction reserve price does not depend on β or  under 
the separate channel management strategy).  That is, we evaluated the following: 
                  
           
          
       
       (12) 
              
        
         
      
       (13) 
   
        
           
            (14) 
   
       
        
           (15) 
Note that in the above equations we suppress the dependency of the AS probability and the optimal 
reserve price,   
 , on the rest of the parameters.  
Our numerical investigation shows that for all parameter combinations the optimal reserve price in 
the direct channel,   
 , went up due to a marginal increase in β or  (i.e.,    
  >0). However, only for 
119,550 (66.4%) of the parameter combinations considered        (and thus       ) was positive, and 
for  46,180 (25.6%) of cases it was negative. This shows that in 25.6% of the cases, the direct effect of the 
higher    dominated the indirect effect of the higher reserve price. Finally, for 154,760 (86%) of the 
                                                          
4
 We note that although the AS probability is a function of RA and N, under the separate management strategy the 
sign of the change in the AS probability due to a change in β (or in ) does not depend on N or RA. 
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parameter combinations       (and thus      ) was negative, and for 25,240 combinations (14%) it 
was positive. Table 2 summarizes the results of the numerical analysis. 
Table 2. Results of Numerical Investigation when the Seller Manages Channels Separately 
 Positive Negative Zero 
       &        119,550 (66.4%) 46, 180 (25.6%)  14,270 (8 %) 
   
     180,000 (100%) 0 0 
      &       25,240 (14%)  154, 760 (86%) 0 
   
    180,000 (100%) 0 0 
Note. The first number in each cell is the number of cases that fall in that category. The second 
number is the percentage of cases. 
 
Our results demonstrate that when channels are managed separately, not all improvements in seller’s 
capabilities related to the direct channel have the same effect on the auctions performance. While higher 
offers in the direct channel lead in many cases (66.4%) to higher auction-sale and item-sale probabilities, 
a higher volume of offers has in most cases (86%) the opposite effect. This implies that the seller 
increases the reserve price in the direct channel to a higher degree when the improvement is in the level of 
the offers than when the improvement is in the volume of the offers in the direct channel. Finally, based 
on our numerical investigation of the model, we derive the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1. When managing the two channels separately:  
a) The expected auction sale price in case of a sale (EP) is independent of the quality of the offers in 
the direct channel (β) and the volume of offers ().  
b) The optimal reserve price in the non-auction channel increases with both the quality of the offers 
and the volume of offers. 
c) The auction-sale and item-sale probabilities decrease as the volume of offers increases, but are 
likely to increase as quality of offers increases. 
4.2. Channels Managed Jointly 
When the seller manages the two channels jointly, he sets the two reserve prices, RA and RD, to maximize 
the total profit as given in Equation 4. When β or  increases we expect the seller to increase RD and, as 
prior research suggests (Genesove 1995), to also increase RA. While a higher RD has a positive effect on 
the auction-sale and item-sale probabilities, a higher RA would have a negative effect on both. In addition, 
unlike in the separate management case, here an increase in β or  may also have an indirect effect on the 
expected auction price due to its potential effect on the auction reserve price,  RA.  
Since it is not possible to derive closed-form expressions for the optimal reserve prices, we 
determined the optimal prices and the resulting values of the three auction outcomes numerically. 
Specifically, for any given combination of parameters values, (H, L, β, , c,  , and N) we searched for the 
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optimal values of (RA, RD) by evaluating numerically the profit from Equation 4 at any possible 
combination of (RA, RD), changing RA from L to H and changing RD from βL to βH in increments of 1.We 
could not use the F.O.C numerically because in some cases the profit was not consistently a concave 
function of a reserve price. Our program identifies the (RA, RD) combination that yields the highest profit 
and then evaluates the three outcomes of interest, according to Equations 7-9, at the optimal reserve prices 
and given the values of all other parameters. Finally, for each of the 180,000 combinations of parameter 
values, we evaluated the following 6 expressions as well as the changes in the optimal reserve prices 
(   
        
       
            
    :  
         (        
           
        )    (    
       
    )     (16) 
        (     
        
     )    (   
      
   )     (17) 
         (        
           
        )    (    
       
    )         (18) 
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        
     )    (   
      
   )      (19) 
         (        
           
        )    (    
       
    )     (20) 
        (     
        
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Note that in above expressions we suppress the dependency of EP, AS, IS, and the optimal reserve 
prices on all unchanged, parameters. Table 3 displays the results of the numerical investigation. 
Table 3. Results of Numerical Investigation when Seller Manages Channels Jointly 
 Positive Negative Zero 
       10,575 (5.8%) 168,260 (93.47%) 1,165 (0.64 %) 
       11,441 (6.35%) 167,468 (93.04%) 1,091 (0.6%) 
       114,282 (63.49%) 176 (0.09%) 65,542 (36.41%) 
   
     116,465 (64.7%) 0 63,535 (35.3%) 
   
     171,170 (95%) 0 8,830 (5%) 
      13,560 (7.5%)  166,440 (92.46%) 0 
      12,761 (7%) 167,239 (92.9%) 0 
      26,854 (14.91%) 1,374 (0.76%) 151,772 (84.3%) 
   
    26,854 (14.91%) 1,374 (0.76%) 151,772 (84.3%) 
   
    104,377 (57.99%) 0 75,623 (42.01%) 
Note. The first number in each cell is the number of cases that fall in that category. The second 
is the percentage of cases. 
 
From Table 3 we see that expecting higher offers in the direct channel (higher β) has in the majority 
of cases (for more than 93% of parameter combinations) a negative impact on both probabilities (AS and 
IS). In contrast, under the separate management strategy, expecting higher offers in the direct channel had 
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in most case (66.4%) a positive impact on both probabilities. One possible cause for this change in the 
results is that under joint management the seller might increase the auction reserve price in response to 
better sale opportunities in the direct channel, and a higher auction reserve price reinforce the direct 
negative impact a higher β has on the two probabilities. Another possible cause is that the reserve price in 
the direct channel is increased (due to higher β) to a lesser degree under the joint management strategy 
than under the separate management strategy. Finally, we see that the expected auction sale-price went up 
only in 63.5% of the cases, which closely corresponds to the percentage of cases in which the optimal 
auction reserve went up. 
A larger number of offers in the direct channel (higher ) has in majority of cases (for more than 92% 
of parameter combinations) a negative impact on both the AS and IS probabilities. This is a slight 
increase from the 86% of the cases for which we saw a negative impact under the separate management 
strategy. Surprisingly, only for 15% of the cases examined a marginal increase in the number of offers 
had a positive effect on the optimal auction reserve price and the expected auction sale price. Finally, 
while under the separate management strategy the optimal reserve price in the direct channel went up in 
response to a marginal increase in  for all 180,000 cases examined, under the joint management strategy 
it went up only in 58% of the cases.  
We conclude that, under the joint management strategy, the support set of the distribution of offers 
and the volume of offers in the direct channel have different impacts on the auction reserve price and the 
expected auction sale price. While the former (i.e., β) has in most cases a positive impact on the optimal 
auction reserve price and thus on the auction sale-price in case of a sale, the latter (i.e., ) does not. In 
addition, these two demand characteristics clearly impact the reserve price in the non-auction channel 
more often than they impact the reserve price in the auction channel. Finally, based on our numerical 
investigation of the model, we derive the following proposition for the joint management strategy. 
 PROPOSITION 2. When managing the two channels jointly:  
a) The optimal auction reserve price and the expected auction sale price in case of a sale (EP) are 
non-decreasing in the quality (β) and the volume () of offers in the non-auction channel. 
b) The optimal reserve price in the non-auction channel is non-decreasing in the quality and the 
volume of offers in the direct channel. 
c) Both the auction-sale and the item-sale probabilities decrease with the quality of offers (β) and 
with the volume of offers () in the direct channel.  
5.  Empirical Context 
The analytical model provides us with predictions regarding how seller characteristics associated with 
demand in the direct channel influence the online auction channel outcomes. To test the insights from the 
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analytical model, we required a context in which sellers of unique items employ an auction channel along 
with other non-auction channels. The retail market for used cars is a suitable context, as sellers in this 
market (car dealers) often use online auctions on eBay Motors while simultaneously trying to sell the used 
vehicles in their lot and through other online channels (i.e., their own website and 3
rd
 party websites like 
Cars.com or Autotrader.com).  
 The eBay Motors marketplace is the most popular public auction website serving retail (not 
wholesale) buyers of vehicles, and has a gross merchandise volume of approximately 8 billion dollars 
(eBay 2011). While consumers can also sell vehicles on the eBay Motors marketplace, professional 
dealers conduct a large percentage of the auctions. Retailers post an extensive vehicle description on the 
auction site—including the make and the model, pictures, vehicle options, and the vehicle identification 
number (VIN). In addition, all auctions pages indicate general properties of the seller, including feedback 
provided by previous customers.  
 Like other auctions on eBay, eBay Motors auctions are 2
nd
 price English auctions. Using a 
mechanism known as proxy bidding, each bidder enters the highest amount he is willing to bid (referred 
to as his proxy bid), and the auction mechanism then places bids on his behalf, biding as much as 
necessary to make sure that the bidder still wins the item, but not more than the proxy bid. As a result, the 
winner pays a small increment (currently $5 in eBay Motors) over the proxy bid of the second highest 
bidder. The reserve price of the seller is private, and the item will not sell if the highest bid at the end of 
the auction is less than the reserve. In addition, sellers can cancel an auction (even if bids were already 
submitted and reserve was met) if the vehicle sells through another channel. Finally, if the auction does 
not end in a sale the seller can relist the vehicle in a new auction. In summary, the auction mechanism 
matches that in our analytical model. 
5.1. Measures for Seller Characteristics  
In the analytical model we examined how the support of the distribution (represented by β) and the 
volume (λ) of offers in the direct channel affect the auction outcomes of interest. In reality we cannot 
observe the distribution or the frequency of offers that originate from non-auction channels used by auto 
dealers. Thus, in the empirical model we identify two seller characteristics that are likely to impact the 
distribution and the volume of offers in the non-auction channels: (1) the dealer’s retail location and (2) 
her electronic commerce capabilities in non-auction channels.  
 5.1.1. Retail Location. A long series of works in the marketing literature have identified location as 
among the most important aspects of a retail venture (Davies and Harris 1990; Dickinson 1981), 
influencing both the seller’s ability to attract customers and her pricing power. Many consumers prefer to 
engage in face-to-face discussions with salespeople and select a vehicle by visiting local dealerships. This 
makes the physical location of the dealership an important factor in overall performance. Location 
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governs how frequently customers will walk through the lot and what the (average) characteristics of 
those customers will be. Dealers would typically prefer locations providing a high volume of affluent 
customers.  
 To measure the ability of a seller to obtain offers through her offline retail location, we used AnySite 
v8.8 to calculate the average household income (AHI) and the total population (TP) within a 20-minute 
drive from the seller’s dealership address in year 2007. While we were also able to calculate TP and AHI 
values based on mileage, drive-time time was more consistent with models of consumer search (e.g., 
Ratchford and Srinivasan 1993). AnySite is a commercial database that incorporates a variety of public 
and private datasets to enable assessment of retail location quality, making it a relevant measure 
consistent with practice. The measure AHI could be considered as a proxy for the quality of offers (β) 
while the measure TP could be considered as a proxy for the volume of offers (), making the location 
variables from the empirical analysis (AHI and TP) directly relevant to the two parameters from the 
analytical model (β and ).  
 5.1.2. Electronic Commerce Capabilities. Past research has found that electronic commerce 
capabilities improve retailers’ operational performance (Zhu 2004; Zhu and Kraemer 2002). In our 
context, electronic commerce capabilities capture the ability of the seller to attract customers via 
electronic channels other than the online auction channel. Car dealers can attract potential buyers by 
listing their inventory on their own website, and thus the functionality of the dealer’s website can affect 
the volume and quality of the offers received via this channel. In addition, car dealers can use matching 
services run by 3
rd
 parties to list their vehicles. The number of such websites utilized by the seller may 
also affect the frequency at which she receives offers. While measuring capabilities of an organization is 
difficult, measurement of specific IT functionalities (i.e., website features) provides an indicator of the 
underlying capabilities (Zhu and Kraemer 2002). 
 We used two measures of the electronic commerce capability of the seller: (1) the functionality of the 
seller’s website and (2) the average number of unique websites (other than the eBay Motors site) used by 
the seller to list her vehicles. Functionality of the sellers’ website is one way to assess her underlying 
electronic commerce capabilities (Zhu and Kraemer 2002). We refer to this measure as web electronic 
commerce capabilities (ECCWEB). Specifically, to determine the web electronic commerce capabilities of 
the sellers in our data, two researchers examined the websites of the retailers and noted the presence of 
eight website characteristics relevant to auto retailing. These characteristics were adapted from a survey 
created by a leading market research organization specializing in the auto industry and included such 
things as “lists price on website,” and “tool for credit application.” A complete list of the characteristics 
used is found in Appendix A. For each seller (j), the eight website characteristics (c) were summed to 
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calculate an overall web electronic commerce capabilities measure, as given in Equation 22 (where wcj=1 
if the characteristic was present on seller j’s website and 0 otherwise): 
          ∑    
 
   .               (22) 
The second measure of seller’s electronic commerce capabilities captures the extent to which the 
seller’s vehicles have been listed on websites other than the online auction channel. It is common for 
sellers to list the VIN of the vehicle on each site that they use, enabling potential buyers to obtain a 
vehicle history report through one of the available online services such as CARFAX. Thus, an online 
search of the VIN of a vehicle that is being auctioned provides a list of other web pages in which the same 
vehicle is listed, including dealer websites and 3
rd
 party websites such as Yahoo Autos and 
Autotrader.com. As this measure indicates the degree to which sellers searched (for buyers) on other 
websites, we refer to it as SOW electronic commerce capabilities (ECCSOW). Specifically, for each auction 
in our dataset an automated script used Google to search the VIN shortly after the auction end date, 
storing the number of filtered pages (i.e., the number of unique domains) on which the VIN had been 
listed, but excluding websites relating to eBay from the count. The resulting number for auction i by seller 
j is SOWij. Then, SOWij values for all auctions conducted by the seller (j) were averaged (Nj is the number 
of auctions conducted by seller j), as shown in Equation 23:  
          
∑      
  
   
  
 .               (23)  
 The retail location measures of AHI and TP closely correspond to the parameters for the support of 
the distribution (β) and the volume of offers (λ) from the analytical model. However, the correspondence 
between our two measures of electronic commerce capabilities and the analytical model is less clear. Past 
research suggests that website characteristics can influence purchase behavior (Venkatesh and Agarwal 
2006), and thus ECCWEB is expected to be positively related to the volume of offers. Similarly, the level of 
advertising on other websites (ECCSOW) is likely to be positively related to the number of offers, as 
websites like AutoTrader.com and Cars.com facilitate negotiations between dealers and customers. 
Finally, it is also possible that ECCWEB and ECCSOW influence the distribution of offers by affecting the 
types of customers the seller attracts.  
5.2. Control Variables.  
The analysis incorporated a variety of control variables (car, seller, and auction related) that have 
previously been identified to influence auction outcomes. In particular, we controlled for vehicle 
characteristics such as the number of miles, certification, inspection, warranty, vehicle model, vehicle 
color, model year, and the number of auctions in which the vehicle has been listed by the seller.  We also 
controlled for specific auction characteristics, such as the starting bid, the number of bids, and the auction 
length. Finally, we included the number of days since the beginning of the data collection, and the number  
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Table 4. Variables for the Auction Analysis 
Variable Mean SD Unit Description 
Seller Characteristics 
AHI 
75.34 16.39 $M The average household income within a 20-minute 
drive time from the seller’s location, measured in 
2007.  
TP 825.76 656.22 M 
The total population within a 20-minute drive time 
from the seller’s location, measured in 2007.  
ECCWEB 5.13 1.94 features 
The number of features on the sellers’ websites (see 
Appendix A). 
  ECCSOW 1.87 0.78 links 
The average number of unique links resulting from a 
Google search of the seller’s VINs. 
Auction Outcomes 
Auction-Sale 0.12 0.32 0/1 An indicator of whether an auction ends in a sale. 
Item-Sale 0.27 0.44 0/1 An indicator of whether a vehicle is sold via the 
online auction channel. 
Sale Price 18.36 12.49 $M The sale price for the vehicles sold at auction. 
Price Premium 0 3.35 $M The auction sale price minus the expected market 
price based upon values of the controls.   
Control Variables 
Miles 43.72 29.18 # The number of miles listed on the car’s odometer. 
  Certified 0.01 0.08 0/1 Whether the seller lists the car as being certified.   
Inspected 0.36 0.48 0/1 Whether the seller lists the car as being inspected 
Warranty 0.55 0.50 0/1 Whether the seller lists the car as having a warrant. 
Vehicle Model NA NA 0/1 The vehicle model, determined from the first 8 digits 
of the VIN.   
Vehicle Color NA NA 0/1 x 7 The color of the vehicle, including 7 colors. 
Model Year NA NA 0/1 x 6 The model year of the vehicle, including 2000-2006. 
Time 9.89 5.75 days The number of weeks since the start of the data 
collection (accounts for depreciation). 
  Positive Feedback 485.32 532.31 # The number of positive feedback messages left on the 
seller’s eBay profile at the time of the auction. 
Negative 
Feedback 
3.27 5.80 # The number of negative feedback messages left on 
the seller’s eBay profile at the time of the auction. 
# of Auctions 4.15 3.74 auctions The number of total auctions for the vehicle in the 
dataset.  
# of Bids 11.96 8.38 bids The number of bids placed in the auction. 
Auction Length 7.10 2.25 days The auction length in days.  
Starting Bid 5.55 9.45 $M The starting bid set by the seller in the auction 
Ended on 
Weekend 
0.21 0.41 0/1 Whether an auction ended on a weekend.  
Ended in Buy-it-
Now 
0.07 0.25 0/1 Whether an auction ended in buy-it-now. 
Notes. M = thousand; N=43,461 (auctions) for all except for price analysis where N=5,144. 
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of positive and negative feedback ratings of the seller. Table 4 presents the variables of interest to the 
model and the control variables, and provides basic descriptive statistics. 
6. Data and Analysis 
Using an automated agent we collected data from 1,217,800 auctions on eBay Motors during late 2006 
through early 2007, extracting information on the vehicle, the seller, and the auction, as detailed in Table 
4. To reduce extremes in price outcomes resulting from product differences, we eliminated from the 
dataset all vehicles with a model year earlier than 2000, incomplete information on the VIN, unclear 
titles, or listing outside of the United States. In addition, we further eliminated vehicle models for which 
there were not at least 3 sales in the dataset. Finally, as the mechanism of influence suggested by our 
analysis is the sellers’ reserve prices, we also eliminated all auctions in which the seller did not set a 
reserve price. We expect that auctions with no reserve price involved sellers with the specific objective of 
liquidating vehicles, making the nature of their search process fundamentally different from that of sellers 
that are maximizing profit. 
For practical reasons (i.e., time required for collecting additional information from dealers websites), 
we selected only the most active sellers — those that sold at least 15 vehicles on eBay Motors during the 
period of the sample — for additional analysis. We used the information in these sellers’ auction pages to 
locate the website and the physical location of each seller
5
, and we eliminated all sellers for which we 
could not find information regarding other channels. For this subset of selected sellers, we collected 
additional information regarding the degree to which each seller could attract buyers through non-auction 
channels (i.e., we determined the values of AHIj, TPj, ECCWEB(j), and ECCSOW(j)). The final dataset 
included 296 multichannel retailers, 43,461 auctions, 21,630 unique vehicles, and 5,144 vehicles sales. 
Prior to empirical analysis, the variables AHIj, TPj, ECCWEB(j), and ECCSOW(j), positive feedback, negative 
feedback, and number of total auctions were logged because an examination of the raw data indicated 
highly skewed distributions.  After being transformed, the variables approximated a normal distribution.  
 We model the probability an auction ends in a sale (AuctionSaleij) using logistic regression as given in 
Equation 24. The vector Sj is the vector of seller characteristics influencing the demand in other channels 
(i.e., AHIj, TPj, ECCWEB(j), and ECCSOW(j)), Civj is the vector of controls (for auction i of vehicle v, by seller 
j) which are listed in Table 4, and α are the parameters to be estimated.   
  (               |       )  
 
   
                
    (24) 
 The probability a vehicle is sold via the auction channel (ItemSalevj) is also modeled using logistic 
regression, and is given in Equation 25. Here, the analyses are at the level of the vehicle, and thus controls 
                                                          
5 
Sellers who are also auto dealers frequently list their website address along with additional identifying information 
on their auction webpage.  
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that are at the auction level (start bid, # bids, etc.) were averaged over all the auctions in which the 
vehicle was offered, while controls that are at the vehicle or seller level were left as is, resulting in a 
vector of controls Cvj. As before, Sj is the vector of seller characteristics influencing demand in other 
channels, and  are parameter estimates.  
     (            |      )  
 
   
                
          (25) 
 The impact of seller characteristics on the auction sale price of vehicles was calculated in two 
different ways. First, we simply used the auction sale price of the vehicle, SalePriceij, in an OLS 
regression including the seller characteristics, Sj, and the controls,     , as given in Equation 26 where  is 
the vector of the parameter estimates, and  is the error terms.   
            (   )  (      )           (26) 
 A limitation of this method, however, is that it includes only vehicles sold by our subset of sellers 
selected for additional analysis. Because of this, coefficient estimates for vehicle characteristics do not 
incorporate information from the broader set of vehicles sold. To address this limitation, we first used 
auction sale prices from all sellers in our data (those with less than 15 sales included) to generate 
coefficients (θ) for an estimate of the market price based only on the controls and omitting any seller 
characteristics related to other channels:   
 [             ]  (     )             (27) 
 Then, for each auction sale by a seller from our subset of selected sellers we subtracted the expected 
market price (      ) from the actual sale price to calculate the price premium for the seller in the auction: 
                   [             ]          (28) 
Finally, we regressed the identified seller characteristics on the price premium, as given in Equation 29, 
which gave the parameters (Ψ) for the seller characteristics associated with other channels, Sj. In this last 
step we did not include the controls, as they are incorporated into the calculation of the price premium. 
          (   )                (29) 
7. Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics for all the variables are given in Table 4, and correlations between all variables are 
given in Table 5. Our four measures of the sellers’ non-auction channels capabilities (AHI, TP, ECCWEB 
and ECCSOW) are not highly correlated indicating they are measuring different seller characteristics. In 
addition, while auction-sale and item-sale are understandably correlated (.61), the correlation is low 
enough that it justifies examining these dependent variables separately. 
  The results from the logistic regression analyses and the price analyses are found in Table 6. Before 
discussing the main results, we discuss some interesting findings for relevant control variables. Several of 
the controls in our analysis (miles, certified, inspected, warranty) corresponded with the level of quality 
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uncertainty associated with the vehicle. The miles of the vehicle is positively related with auction-sale 
(p<.001) and item-sale (p<.001), and negatively related to the price (p<.001). A warranty had the opposite 
effect, being negatively related to auction/item-sale (p<.001), and positively related to the price (p<.001). 
These findings suggest that having lower quality uncertainty (due to lower miles or a warranty) increased 
the likelihood the vehicle would be sold through non-auction channels, but at the same time increased the 
auction price in case of a sale. In addition, the combination of reduced likelihood of sale in the auction 
channel and increased price in case of a sale suggests that the effect on the seller reserve price exceeded 
the effect on bidders’ willingness to pay
6
. Whether the car was certified or not had no effect on any of the 
auction channel outcomes. Being inspected influenced positively both the likelihood of auction/item-sale 
(p<.001) and the price, suggesting that the effect of being certified on bidders’ willingness to pay 
exceeded the effect on sellers’ reserve price.   
The number of positive feedbacks was, as expected, positively associated with auction-sale (p<.001) 
and item-sale (p<.001). In addition, while the number of positive feedbacks did not have the expected 
positive association with the auction sale price, it was positively associated (p<.001) with the expected 
market price (Equation 27). Thus, when not taking into account seller characteristics related to demand in 
other channels, the positive feedback had a significant impact on auction sale-price, but once 
incorporating these characteristics the impact was no longer significant. Negative feedback had the 
opposite effects, decreasing the probability of auction-sale (p<.001) and item-sale (p<.01) while reducing 
the auction sale price (p<.01) and the expected market price (p<.001). A higher starting bid was positively 
associated with auction-sale (p<.001), item-sale (p<.001), and the price when a sale occurred (p<.001). 
Vehicles were more likely to sell when auctions ended on a weekend (p<.05), and the auctions ending in 
the buy-it-now option had on average a higher sale price
7
. Finally, the findings for the number of auctions 
control indicate the complex nature of the search process of multichannel retailers. An increase in the 
number of total auctions for the vehicle reduces the likelihood that the current auction would end in a sale 
(p<.001). However, an increase in the total number of auctions in which the vehicle is offered increases 
the likelihood it is sold in the online auction channel (p<.001). In addition, the number of auctions was 
negatively related to the auction sale price when the price regression included seller characteristics 
associated to demand in non-auction channels (p<.05), but positively related to the estimated market price 
(Equation 27) calculated based only on the controls (p<.01). 
                                                          
6
 Buyers are willing to pay more for a car with a warranty. The seller, on the other hand, might set a higher reserve 
price when the car has a warranty. Both changes (in buyers’ valuations and in the seller’s reserve) contribute to a 
higher expected sale price, but while the former increases the likelihood of a sale the latter decreases it. 
7
 Because buy-it-now was perfectly associated with auction-sale/item-sale, it was dropped from these analyses. 
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 The main results from the analyses generally support the analytical model outcomes for the joint 
channel management strategy. We find that higher average household income in the dealer’s surrounding 
reduced the likelihood of auction-sale (p<.001) and item-sale (p<.05), but increased the selling price 
(p<.05) and the price premium (p<.05) when a sale occurred. Similarly, the total population surrounding 
the dealer location was associated with lower likelihood of item-sale in the auction channel (p<.01), but 
higher sale price (p<.05) and price premium (p<.01 ) when a sale occurred. The relationship between total 
population and auction-sale was in the expected direction but not significant. These findings indicate that 
retailers with better offline retail location face lower likelihood of selling vehicles in the auction channel, 
but higher sale price when a sale occurs. 
Both measures of electronic commerce capabilities of the dealer were negatively associated with the 
likelihood of auction-sale (ECCWEB, p<.001; ECCSOW, p<.05) and the likelihood of item-sale in the online 
auction channel (ECCWEB, p<.001; ECCSOW, p<.001), but positively associated with the auction sale price 
(ECCWEB, p<.01; ECCSOW, p<.001). Results for the price effects were also significant using the alternate 
measure of price premium (ECCWEB, p<.001; ECCSOW, p<.05).   
 In summary, the results were consistent with the predictions of the analytical model for the joint 
channel management (Proposition 2). In addition, seller characteristics related to the non-auction channels 
influenced the auction channel outcomes in a way consistent with search theory—i.e., variables indicating 
opportunities in non-auction channels were negatively related to the likelihood an auction ends in a sale, 
but positively related to the sale price, suggesting sellers with better opportunities in other channels set 
higher auction reserve prices.  
 Finally, in order to understand the relative impact of changes in the independent variables on 
outcomes, we used the results from the logistic analyses to calculate the marginal effects across the range 
of the logged variables.  Overall, effect sizes for the outcome variables, shown in Table 7, are in a range 
where they are meaningful.  Effects sizes for item-sale were stronger (4.72% - 10.15%) than for auction 
sale (n.s. - 3.67%). This suggests that seller characteristics which impact demand in other channels 
influence the auction-channel outcome more than an individual auction outcome, which may be subject to 
more variability.  Further, the effect sizes for the impact of average household income ($879/$562), total 
population ($828/$868), and ECCWEB ($856/$1,174) were similar across the calculation of price and price 
premium, respectively.  The effect for ECCSOW was significantly larger for the price calculation ($1,725) 
than the price premium calculation ($539), but in the same direction. To frame the above effects sizes in 
terms of the context, we note that on average dealerships reported net profits of approximate $220 per 
vehicle in 2007 (NADA 2008).    
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 Table 5. Correlation Table 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Miles 1                   
2 Certified -.01 1                  
3 Inspected -.10 .08 1                 
4 Warranty -.58 .06 .10 1                
5 Time .03 .00 -.01 -.03 1               
6 Positive Feedback .02 -.01 -.23 .02 -.01 1 
             7 Negative Feedback .16 -.04 -.16 -.02 -.04 .55 1 
            8 # of Auctions -.12 .05 .05 .14 -.08 .11 -.01 1 
           9 Number of Bids .02 -.01 .06 -.01 .03 .00 .01 .02 1 
          10 Auction Length -.04 -.02 -.08 .01 .05 .21 -.01 .12 .09 1 
         11 Starting Bid -.23 .00 -.05 .14 -.04 -.13 -.14 -.05 -.38 .02 1 
        12 Weekend .01 .00 .05 .00 .00 -.05 .01 .01 .01 .02 .00 1 
       13 Buy-It-Now .02 .00 .01 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.03 -.13 -.09 -.27 .04 .01 1 
      14 Household Inc. -.03 -.02 .08 .02 .01 -.18 -.24 .09 .01 -.08 .01 .00 -.01 1 
     15 Total Population .02 .04 .08 -.04 -.01 .04 -.04 .10 -.01 .03 -.04 -.03 .02 .03 1 
    16 ECCWEB -.15 .05 .12 .12 .03 -.17 -.23 .01 .13 -.12 -.14 .05 -.04 .13 -.05 1 
   17 ECCSOW -.14 .01 -.10 .13 .00 .11 -.04 .13 -.03 .17 .04 .02 -.05 .10 -.02 .16 1 
  18 Auction-sale .08 -.01 .01 -.08 -.05 -.04 -.01 -.17 -.01 -.22 .02 .01 .74 -.02 .00 -.05 -.08 1 
 19 Item-sale .09 .01 .02 -.08 -.11 -.01 -.01 .05 .03 -.08 -.02 .00 .45 .00 .02 -.09 -.09 .61 1 
























(0.089) (0.090) (0.259) 
 
(0.209) 




(0.020) (0.020) (0.057) 
 
(0.045) 













(0.035) (0.036) (0.114) 
 
(0.085) 
ln(Miles) 0.067*** 0.086*** -1.829*** -0.798***  
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.073) (0.034)  
 Certified -0.225 -0.005 0.675 0.258  
 (0.223) (0.228) (0.696) (0.243)  
 Inspected 0.240*** 0.255*** 0.273** 0.227***  
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.100) (0.069)  
 Warranty -0.158*** -0.172*** 0.973*** 1.485***  
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.125) (0.089)  
 Time -0.029*** -0.040*** 0.006 -0.022*** 
 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
 ln (Positive Feedback) 0.196*** 0.192*** -0.028 0.119*** 
 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.048) (0.025) 
 ln (Negative Feedback) -0.210*** -0.211*** -0.175** -0.265*** 
 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.057) (0.047) 
 ln(Number of Auctions) -0.838*** 0.247*** -0.155* 0.169** 
 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.069) (0.053) 
 Number of Bids 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.045*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) 
 Auction Length -0.265*** -0.171*** 0.052* 0.059*** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.021) (0.015) 
 Starting Bid 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.051*** 0.108*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 




 -0.059 -0.324*** 
 
 
(0.039) (0.046) (0.110) (0.076) 




   
(0.107) (0.078) 
 Constant 3.510*** 1.678
Ψ
 34.355*** 33.100*** -7.127** 
 
(1.003) (1.016) (2.980) (0.407) (2.303) 





 0.138 0.059 0.958 0.945 0.011 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, 
Ψ
 p<0.10;  
1 
Price from OLS regression including the seller characteristics and the controls.  
2 
Price calculations 
based only on the controls and including all multichannel sellers. 
3
Dummy variables for vehicle model 






Table 7. Marginal Effects Across Range of Independent Variables 




Price  Price 
Premium 
ln(Average Household Income) 10.80 12.15 -3.67% -4.72% $879 $562 
ln(Total Population) 9.20 15.78 (N.S.) -6.40% $828 $868 
ln(ECCWEB) 0.00 2.20 -2.01% -7.47% $856 $1,174 
ln(ECCSOW) -1.64 1.59 -1.59% -10.15% $1,725 $539 
Note: N.S. =Non significant  
7. Discussion 
The Internet and online auctions in particular have influenced the way that buyers and sellers interact in a 
variety of industries. As sales processes are conducted in both online and offline channels, and retailers 
have many options as to where and at what prices they can list their products, it is necessary to gain a 
greater understanding of multichannel activities of buyers and sellers (Neslin and Shankar 2009). Our 
work contributes to this stream of research, offering an analytical and empirical treatment of seller use of 
online auctions along with other online and offline channels, and demonstrating the interdependency of 
the channels. The findings provide insights into important auction channel outcomes and the associated 
revenue for sellers, and thus have implications for both theory and practice, as is further discussed below.  
7.1. Implications for Theory 
This paper makes several contributions to the theoretical understanding of how sellers operate when using 
online auctions along with other sales channels and to the study of online auctions in multichannel 
contexts. First, past research on online auctions has mainly used auction sale price or the likelihood a 
reserve price will be met (e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007) as characteristics of 
the auction channel performance. This research further identifies the combination of sale price, 
probability an individual auction ends in a sale, and the probability the item sales via the auction channel 
as an inclusive way of understanding how seller characteristics related to other channels influence auction 
outcomes. For example, a positive association between seller characteristics and auction price could result 
from an increase in the bidders’ valuations, an increase in the seller’s reserve price (also often referred to 
as the seller’s valuation), or both. In the case of retail location and electronic commerce capabilities, the 
accompanying reduction in the auction-sale likelihood suggests that the cause of the positive association 
with sale-price was primarily an increase in the seller’s reserve price, because an increase in bidders’ 
valuations would have the opposite effect on auction-sale. These two outcomes alone, however, do not 
characterize whether the increase in the seller valuation is a result of opportunities outside of the auction 
channel or an increase in her willingness to search within the auction channel. If the identified seller 




they would be associated with a higher sale-price and lower auction-sale likelihood but not associated (or 
positively associated) with the item-sale likelihood. The combination of the increase in the auction price 
and a decrease in the auction-sale and item-sale ratios provides substantive evidence that the effects result 
from better opportunities in the non-auction channels. 
 Second, our analytical model further explores the implications of separate and joint channels 
management. With joint channel management, sellers with better opportunities to attract buyers in the 
non-auction channels, increase their reserve price not only in the non-auction channel but also in the 
auction channel. This strategy is likely to result in an increase in auction prices, a reduction in the number 
of auctions that end in a sale, and a reduction of the number of items that sell via the auction channel. In 
contrast, if sellers manage each channel separately (maximizing each channels’ profit in isolation), then 
factors that influence the demand in the non-auction channel would have no effect on the auctions reserve 
prices and the auctions’ sale prices.  
 A third theoretical implication of this work is that it builds upon the stream of research that uses 
search theory to understand behaviors of sellers utilizing auctions. Search theory has long been used to 
understand the consumer shopping process as well as the impact of the Internet on commerce (Putrevu 
and Ratchford 1997; Ratchford and Srinivasan 1993), and on market outcomes (Bakos 1997). Consumers 
search for products until the benefits of continuing the search no longer outweigh the costs, and by 
lowering search costs the Internet has lowered prices and increased welfare through increased product 
variety (Brynjolfsson 1996). In a similar way, sellers that use successive auctions (Bernhardt and Scoones 
1994; Cai et al. 2007) or alternate between auctions and other channels (Genesove 1995) can be 
conceptualized as searching for high-valuation buyers. We add to this stream of literature by showing that 
search theory can be a useful for understanding the decisions of sellers that utilize auctions in parallel to 
other channels.  
 Finally, the empirical findings suggest that researchers must consider biases induced by multichannel 
sales processes when studying online auctions. We find that sellers are likely to manage channels jointly, 
and thus their strategies in the online auction channel would take into account opportunities in non-
auction channels. When sellers use online auctions in parallel to other channels, studies of any single 
channel in isolation may be biased, even if each channel targets a separate group of customers.   
7.2. Implications for Practice 
This work also has several implications for practitioners. First, while operating in a multichannel retail 
environment is likely to be very complex for organizations, we suggest that conceptualizing the use of 
multiple channels as a search process can provide a relevant framework for optimizing such business 




most cases increase the seller’s reserve prices across all channels she uses. The optimal strategy in a given 
channel should be linked to seller’s characteristics affecting its demand in other channels.  
Second, when sellers evaluate the performance of their auctions, they should consider all three 
outcomes presented in this paper. For example, a decrease in the auction-sale likelihood (% of auctions 
that end in a sale) might be perceived badly when considered in isolation, but if it is accompanied by an 
increase in the sale prices and a decrease in the item-sale likelihood then it might indicate that the seller 
simply improved her capabilities to attract offers in other channels. 
Finally, price sensitive consumers may be able to improve their welfare by searching for sellers who 
do not have access to other channels. As shown here, sellers with multichannel operations—and 
especially those with strong alternative channels—are more likely to expect higher sale prices without 
providing any specific benefit relative to other online sellers.  
7.3. Limitations 
One key limitation of the empirical work presented here is that it involves only one class of products (i.e., 
vehicles) and thus the results may be different when considering other types of products. For example, 
while for vehicles the market on eBay acts as a discount channel when compared to the offline channel, 
probably due to the fact that it is harder to determine quality of a vehicle when buying online, for other 
product categories the online auction market might provide a channel in which comparable prices can be 
obtained. Another limitation is that we cannot examine how direct characteristics of the demand in the 
other channels (such as the frequency and the distribution of offers) affect auction outcomes. Thus, we 
have to infer the relationships between observable seller characteristics (such as retail location) and the 
characteristics of the demand in non-auction channels. 
Finally, our analytical results were derived considering a specific distribution of consumers’ 
valuations, the uniform distributions. We acknowledge that analytical models with other distributions 
might reach somewhat different conclusions. However, we are encouraged by the fact that the empirical 
results comply with our analytical model predictions.  
8. Conclusion 
The Internet and electronic commerce provide retailers with tremendous flexibility in the ways they 
engage and transact with customers. This research shows how the online auction channel outcomes are 
impacted by seller characteristics that influence her demand in other channels. While prior work examines 
auction outcomes considering the auction channel in isolation, this is among the first papers to investigate 
how the auction outcomes relate to a seller’s multichannel activities and characteristics. 
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Appendix A. Dealer’s website functionalities used to determine the dealers electronic commerce 
capabilities (ECCWEB) 
1. Lists price on website. 
2. Lists options on website. 
3. Lists all new vehicles on website. 
4. Lists photo on website. 
5. Links to independent sites. 
6. Tool for credit application. 
7. Price quotes request form. 
 
